American culture appears to be deeply divided: those who believe there are absolute moral truths contend with those who place moral authority in individual judgment. Armed with these competing visions, "orthodox" versus "progressive" culture warriors clash on issues of abortion, homosexuality, feminism, school prayer, multiculturalism, popular culture, and university curricula. The population is increasingly polarized as a result.
into the two opposing camps of the culture war, or whether both sides share the same American cultural ideas in propounding their differing visions. I ‹nd support for the latter view in my analysis of the 436 articles dealing with culture war issues that were published in four popular political magazines between 1980 and 2000. The culture war debaters in the pages of National Review, Time, The New Republic, and The Nation-magazines representing the mainstream American political spectrum, from National Review on the right to The Nation on the left-adhere to remarkably similar cultural principles.
Rather than dividing along the lines of "orthodox" versus "progressive" morality, the arguments of culture war partisans are nuanced and riddled with internal disagreements. There are abortion rights supporters who regret the immorality of abortion and antihomosexuality advocates who dispute whether or not homosexual behavior is a matter of morality. The symbols and rhetoric of the two sides often mirror each other. Consider the following statement: "A culture that is at once moralistic, self-righteous, alienated, and in a minority will constantly be tempted to break the rules of political discourse." Are these the words of a progressive describing the efforts of Christian Fundamentalists to in›uence American politics? No. This is a description of the Left written by a well-known conservative (Bork 1989, 27) .
While there are doubtless persons for whom the binary logic of the culture wars is all-important, the elites represented in the pages of these mainstream media-the journalists and intellectuals, feminists and "family values" advocates alike-instead re›ect shared cultural patterns. These discussions take place within the context of enduring American dilemmas-about the role of religion in politics and society, the tension between morality and pragmatism, how much individualism should be sacri‹ced for larger community goals, the meaning of pluralism in a "nation of immigrants," and how to reconcile the will of the people with standards enunciated by elites.
Though they disagree about speci‹c issues and policies, the partisans on all sides subscribe to the following ideas: (1) respect for religion but uncertainty about its role; (2) use of moral frameworks but without "moralizing"; (3) belief in individualism but not to excess; (4) respect for pluralism but within one culture; (5) ambivalence toward elites; and (6) a high regard for moderation. The ‹rst ‹ve of these items represent dilemmas to which 2 culture wars and enduring american dilemmas the high regard for moderation is something of an answer. Thus, religion is of great importance, but American society is both secular and diverse in its religions. Individualism is a supreme American value, but the needs of the community must be respected too. Ironically, the only unalloyed American virtue is that of moderation. Moderation, of course, does not constitute a dilemma. But the very vitality of moderation presents dilemmas for social movements. In a society that views as beyond the pale both ardent feminists and committed traditionalists, the strongly religious and atheists, fervent supporters and opponents of abortion, those who attempt to alter the culture are pressured toward a centrism that may be antagonistic to their basic beliefs.
While issues such as abortion or same-sex marriage may be new, the underlying dilemmas are of long duration. If every culture can be seen as "a kind of theater in which certain contrary tendencies are played out" (Erikson 1976, 82) , these are classic American cultural conundrums. And though they may not be the only dilemmas in American culture, they are the ones that are central to the "culture wars."
Participants and observers alike contend that the culture wars originated in the late 1960s, when challenges to traditional values were dubbed the counterculture. The very idea of a "counterculture" suggests a new selfconsciousness about cultural struggles regarding values and lifestyles. In the trajectory from the counterculture to the culture wars, what is new is not the political struggle over cultural issues but rather a heightened awareness of culture itself and those who seek to shape it. Both social scientists and the general public have come to think of culture as changeable and contested. And a self-conscious competition for cultural dominance has become more evident. While the "social construction of reality" has not become a household term akin to "charisma" or "lifestyle," an awareness of the provisional nature of social assumptions has "entered popular consciousness" (Wrong 1990, 28) .
The Culture Wars
In one of the earliest and best-known portraits of the culture wars, James
Davison Hunter (1991) described a fundamental split between orthodox and progressive views of morality and suggested that this divide cuts across
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class, religious, racial, ethnic, political, and sexual lines. In the eyes of one partisan, the culture war is apparent in the simultaneous emergence of "moral disarray" and "moral revival" symbolized by the success of both gangsta rap and gospel rock (Himmelfarb 1999, 117) .
A year after Hunter put "culture wars" on the social science map, Patrick Buchanan popularized the idea in his speech to the 1992 Republican National Convention. He told the audience in Houston that "a cultural war" was taking place, a "struggle for the soul of America." The de‹ning issues were abortion, homosexuality, school choice, and "radical feminism."
In the aftermath of this address, the idea of a "culture war" became a journalistic staple.
But for all the credence given to the idea of culture wars in the press, public opinion analysts present a different portrait (see N. J. Davis and Robinson 1996a , 1996b , 1997 DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; J. H. Evans 1997; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; A. S. Miller and Hoffman 1999; C. Smith et al. 1997; Wolfe 1998; Wuthnow 1996) . Only small percentages of Americans are consistently orthodox or progressive on such issues as abortion, stem cell research, the morning-after pill, gay marriage, and gay adoption (Pew Research Center 2006b) . And while "the gap between the ideologically consistent liberals and conservatives may have widened a bit," there are now fewer Americans "in those fragments" than there were in the 1960s (Fischer and Hout 2006, 238) .
Religious conservatives and liberals differ in their religious beliefs, however, and there is a loose correspondence between people's religious identities and their views on abortion, homosexuality, and school prayer (N. J. Davis and Robinson 1996; Wuthnow 1996 1996b, 235; Kohut et al. 2000, 64) . Even among people who identify themselves as part of the Religious Right, some 30 percent are Democrats, and 60 percent think abortion should be legal in some circumstances (C. Smith et al. 1997, 182) . Among committed evangelical Protestants, one-third believe that abortions should be available to women in circumstances other than rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother, and 41 percent of committed Catholics believe likewise (Kohut et al. 2000, 64) .
The proportion of conservative Protestants who are so consistently pro-life that they reject abortion even when a mother's health is at stake is only 3 percent, a ‹gure that has not changed in recent decades (Greeley and Hout 2006, 125) .
Not only do the religiously orthodox show "little ideological consistency across a broad spectrum of attitudes," but their attitudes also differ by gender, race, social class, and age (N. J. Davis and Robinson 1996b, 237 1996, 326 ). An ethnographic study of one evangelical and one mainline Protestant seminary found that although they maintain competing moral visions, "the more intense battles are internal to each culture" (Carroll and Marler 1995, 18 James Davison Hunter has acknowledged that "most Americans occupy a vast middle ground between the polarizing impulses of American culture" and that "public discourse is more polarized than the American public" (1991, 43, 159) . But he maintains that the culture war is not a matter of public opinion, about what is in people's heads or hearts. Rather, it is about the public culture. And in this culture, elites on both sides of the dispute force attitudes or opinions into their molds, thereby eliminating
Culture Wars and Warring about Culturethe middle ground. The two sides are in a struggle "over the meaning of America" (50). Individuals "become subservient to" or "must struggle against the dominating and virtually irresistible categories and logic of the culture war" (1998, 14) . The culture war is "not re›ected so deeply in public sentiment" (Hunter and Wolfe 2006, 93) . But this does not mean that there is a centrist consensus. Rather, "the competing moral visions in public culture" are "a reality sui generis" (Hunter 1996, 246) . Any coherent center that may exist is eclipsed by "the grid of rhetorical extremes" that either labels moderates as "wishy-washy" or judges them by the standards of the extremists-so that, for example, a moderate conservative on issues of homosexuality will still be dubbed a homophobe ( How, then, can one determine the truth of the assertion of a culture war?
How does one study the "public culture" or tap into the "deep differences"
within contemporary American culture? Hunter's initial discussion of the culture wars focused on the advertising and persuasive literature emanating from culture war organizations and spokespersons. Yet scholars have long 10 culture wars and enduring american dilemmas recognized that organizations and movements that seek public support tend to state their claims in exaggerated form. To overcome inertia and to motivate ‹nancial contributions, they emphasize the dire consequences of doing nothing or allowing the opposition to prevail. The public culture clearly encompasses more than the rhetoric of fund-seeking partisans.
Hunter recognizes that culture war issues ‹lled "the nation's newspapers, magazines, and intellectual journals" (1991, 176 ), yet he focused on the sixty-second commercials, full-page advertisements, sound bites on the evening news, op-ed pieces, and direct mail letters that resulted in "much of public discourse" being "reduced to a reciprocal bellicosity" (170). Despite the "extremism and super‹ciality" of these sources, Hunter argued that they provided "the only objecti‹cation of the debate that really exists" (170).
But why should one make this assumption? Since the elites who shape the public culture express themselves in many venues, it seems rather arbitrary to de‹ne "public discourse" in such narrow terms. An analysis of the opinions and assumptions presented in large-circulation political maga- Hunter has argued that "within the contemporary public discourse, one risks being branded a 'right-winger' by even invoking moral criteria. Indeed, the very word 'morality' has become a right-wing word" (1991, 323) .
And "the concept of religion or transcendence is also very often dismissed by secular progressivists as 'right-wing'" (324). My analysis of the writings of partisans on both the left and the right does not support such hyperbolic images. Rather, the spokespersons for both sides have "drawn on the same symbolic code to . . . advance their competing claims," as J. C. Alexander and Smith found in their analysis of discourse within earlier American civil debates (1993, 197 ).
An empirical test of the culture war hypothesis is of some signi‹cance to both social scientists and the general public. For the most part, empirical researchers have tended to reject the idea of a culture war based on surCulture Wars and Warring about Culturevey data, while those who defend the hypothesis have done so without empirical research into the "deep culture" whose existence they claim. I hope that a systematic study of the public discourse about culture wars will shed light on the topic in a way that goes beyond the persuasive analyses of survey researchers.
There is, of course, an intuitive appeal-a surface plausibility-to the culture war idea, given the differences in the ideas espoused by Jerry
Falwell, Pat Robertson, and Patrick Buchanan, on the one hand, and feminists, gay-marriage advocates, and abortion-rights supporters on the other.
Even some social scientists are so wedded to the culture war concept that they behave like the proverbial pessimists who see only the doughnut hole. 
Warring over Culture
The culture war debates are embedded within a larger contention concerning the nature of culture itself. Unlike the culture wars, however, disputes about the concept of culture are not new. The term culture, used in the an-12 culture wars and enduring american dilemmas thropological sense to describe how people think and behave, is generally traced to the 1870s. It was popularized in the 1930s and became an essential part of social science. Yet as early as 1952, some sociologists and anthropologists rejected the concept as "so broad as to be useless in scienti‹c discourse" (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952, 5) . Half a century later, the utility of the concept is questioned not because it is too broad but because it is too precise. Critics argue that culture implies a degree of structure, coherence, and stability that is not found in social reality (Brumann 1999).
The reigning image of culture in the 1950s was that of a set of basic values internalized early in life and shaping one's very being. By the end of the twentieth century, culture was more likely to be viewed as a "toolkit" In the 1970s, Clifford Geertz reoriented the study of culture to public and symbolic meanings. He argued that culture should be seen neither as a "super-organic reality" that exerts pressure on people nor as the attitudes and beliefs lodged within people's hearts and minds. Rather, culture is the context within which things become intelligible. It contains "webs of signi‹cance," an interpretive search for meaning. "Culture is public because meaning is" (1973, 12) .
A focus on public symbols allowed analysts to avoid questions of how But Geertz's idea that culture should be understood "through the (recording and) interpretation of the publicly available forms in which it is encoded (the 'symbols')" did not come to grips with the problem that culture may no longer be "'contained' in a location and/or attached to a particular group" (Ortner 1999, 6-7). Television, for example, makes such containment problematic. Symbols are now "conveyed by media to individuals without the co-presence of other human beings" (Schudson 1989, 154) . Television anywhere in the world contains an "articulation of the transnational, the national, the local, and the personal," making it dif‹cult to continue to assume that any particular culture is the only or the most powerful way "to make sense of the world" (Abu-Lughod 1999, 129).
Given the multiplicity and complexity of cultural ideas in the contemporary world, the view of culture itself had to change. In the newer view of culture, as people draw on local, national, and global sources of cultural ideas, such "ideas never form a closed or coherent whole" (S. Wright 1998, 10). Cultural "worlds of meaning" are normally "contradictory, loosely integrated, contested, mutable, and highly permeable" (Sewell 1999, 53) .
Indeed, in complex contemporary societies, attempts to pin down the "mainstream" or "dominant" culture often lead to the "intellectually em- Be that as it may, by the late twentieth century, earlier notions that a uni‹ed culture determined behavior were increasingly called into question.
Research in cognitive psychology suggests that "our heads are full of images, opinions, and information, untagged as to truth values to which we 14 culture wars and enduring american dilemmas are inclined to attribute accuracy and plausibility" (DiMaggio 1997, 267) .
Some ideas are more accessible than others, and cues in the environment may bring them to the surface. But the fact that the images are internally inconsistent does not appear to affect people's ability to retain and act on those images. Such cognitive research challenges earlier assumptions that culture is acquired only through socialization, and it suggests that people have the capacity to participate in multiple cultural traditions (267-68).
In 1986, Ann Swidler suggested that only a "loose coupling" existed between culture and action. Culture provides people not with a set of values or ultimate ends that shape their behavior but with "strategies of action"-skills, styles, and informal know-how. People draw selectively on these cultural "tool kits." Individual adherents to the culture absorb things selectively and inconsistently, remaining ambivalent toward some aspects of the culture or even adhering to some cultural codes in which they do not really believe (giving Christmas presents, for example) (Swidler 2001, 163) .
Though the tool kit image suggests that culture does not determine human behavior, Swidler acknowledges that "when culture fully takes, it so merges with life as to be nearly invisible" (2001, 19) . Conversely, an increased consciousness of culture may mean that there are fewer experiences of such "unmediated apprehension of how the world is put together and how we should conduct ourselves in it." Whenever "culture is recognized as culture," detachment and doubt result (Carey 1988, 11) . Indeed, the very idea of culture wars suggests that such simple apprehension no longer exists.
A number of scholars have attempted to pursue a middle ground between a deterministic view of culture-in which culture shapes human action-and a more voluntaristic position that allows for greater individual agency in selecting from the available cultural repertoires. Schudson, for example, has argued that neither of these positions is entirely satisfactory.
Instead, he suggests that "sometimes culture 'works' and sometimes it doesn't. Sometimes the media cultivate attitudes, sometimes not; . . . sometimes ideas appear to be switchmen, sometimes they seem to make no difference" (1989, 158) . There is no "universal truth with respect to these prob- Nevertheless, older ideas of culture often remain "embedded in our teaching," as introductory textbooks portray cultures "with unproblematized boundaries" and describe them in terms of "uniform and internally integrated traits" (Goode 2001, 435) . Such simpli‹cations no doubt have their uses. But perhaps, too, they occur because people want to see culture "in precisely the bounded, rei‹ed, essentialized, and timeless fashion that most of us now reject" (Brumann 1999, S11). While we recognize that individuals share certain "commonalities in thought and behavior" because of their membership in the same family, gender, age group, social class, ethnic group, and so forth, there remain characteristics that many Japanese share and that differ from those of Americans (Brumann 1999, S7).
Just as anthropologists are denying the existence of cultural boundaries, people all over the world are consciously and conspicuously marking such boundaries (Sahlins 1999, 414) . Within the United States, people increasingly differentiate themselves from others by using the term culturewhether it is the culture of a particular corporation, the culture of the deaf, or the cultures attached to various forms of popular entertainment. In contemporary Western discourse, "we now literally experience difference as culture" (David Scott 2003, 103) . Perhaps the summation of one social scientist is apt: "we cannot do without a concept of culture" (Sewell 1999, 38) .
In what appears to be the dominant view, then, culture is no longer seen as a total way of life that evolves among a distinct people and is trans- At the end of the 1990s, even Evangelicals expressed more support for women's participation in both the labor market and politics than had been the case a decade earlier, though Evangelicals still prefer traditional family arrangements when children are involved. And though they are much less accepting of homosexuality than is the rest of the society, Evangelicals manifest greater tolerance than they did earlier (McConkey 2001, 169, 172) .
Sometimes a culture war dispute disappears because the particular provocation is removed. Thus, the intense controversy over funding for the arts is "now over-not because we now have agreement on the meaning and value of the arts, but simply because there is neither a policy issue at stake, nor any sort of media attention on debates within the arts" (Kidd And a historian has argued that in our zeal to imagine "a soft multiculturalist notion of a syncretic America," we may well minimize "the pain of cultural brokerage, . . . leaving Pocahontas Disneyized." Those cultural brokers "who were once reviled as 'half-breeds' of treacherously inscrutable 1998, 26) .
From the vantage point of those with the newer view of culture, however, Hunter, Bernstein, and others are "cultural fundamentalists" who are frightened by "the ›imsiness of a culture where everything is in motion and authority has perpetually to prove itself . . . and the fragments of identity are on sale everywhere from the university to the mall" (Gitlin 1995, 223 ). Multiculturalism appears to make a mockery of deeply implanted normative structures.
Critics who accuse multiculturalists of overestimating the signi‹cance of culture, however, allege that multiculturalists make every group appear to have a culture of its own, so that we become incapable of understanding each other across cultural barriers. As one observer puts it, the multiculturalists "have created a cult of incommensurability. But if the differences between individuals and groups were as thick as the multiculturalists think, then not even multiculturalism would be possible. Everybody would be shut up in subjectivity" (Wieseltier 1994, 30) . In "the exaggerated postmodernist perspective" to which some multiculturalists adhere, human beings are "pure products of cultural context," so that no understanding or communication between cultures is possible. This idea not only is false but "provides intellectual backup for a political outlook that sees no real basis for common ground among humans of different sexes, races, and cultures" (Ehrenreich and McIntosh 1997, 15, 16) . Multiculturalists treat culture as if it were "a ‹xed entity, transmitted, as it were, in the genes, rather than through experience" (Chavez 1994, 26) . Left and Right converge here in critiquing the exaggerated in›uence that some multiculturalists impute to culture.
As these critics of multiculturalism see it, no contemporary group can Given the hostility toward multiculturalism from those with very different understandings of culture, it is perhaps not surprising that no commentator in our twenty-one-year sample of political commentary defends the basic concept of multiculturalism. To be sure, some writers are more hostile to the idea than others, and some offer support for educating students about cultural diversity, but enthusiasm for the fundamental concept is strikingly absent.
Arguments about the workings of culture are also implicated in the culture war debates concerning popular culture. Re›ecting the greater likelihood that progressives will adhere to the newer view of culture, most commentators on the left do not see any one-to-one relationship between popular culture and actual behavior. By contrast, those on the right are more likely to see popular culture, art, literature, and other symbolic fare as directly affecting behavior. An editorial in National Review, for example, argues that people who watch TV talk shows "will ‹nd it harder to reject other kinds of behavior that are wrong but less extravagantly perverted, like conventional adultery" (Editorial 1995b, 18) . A liberal commentator, by contrast, suggests that although "the culture now has a surfeit of coarseness, from noxious rap lyrics to the Jerry Springer Show," there is no evidence of moral decline (Whitman 1999, 18) .
Progressives similarly attack what they see as a "simple one-to-one correlation between books and behavior" in the debate over the university Commentators from all sides acknowledge the pervasiveness of popular culture and the dif‹culty of disentangling one's own thoughts from those disseminated by the media (Gibbs and McDowell 1992; Labi 1998; Morrow 1994a) . Conservative writers are more likely to ‹nd these in›uences pernicious and to attribute power over the culture to the Left. "Culture shapes our lives and affects every action we take," says one such commentator, and "the current epidemics of drug use, AIDS, and crime are testimony enough to the power of culture to in›uence our lives. Just think how implicated the cultural agenda of the Left has been in these disasters," since the Left's literature, music, and ‹lms have "glori‹ed every kind of libertinism and polymorphous perversity" (Lipman 1991b, 53) .
Despite disagreements about where power lies, most commentators What is discussed in the culture wars is a matter of the rede‹nition of morality-"a process in which all Americans, from born-again to New Age to agnostic, are already participating" (Judis 1999, 56) . A National Review writer notes that if we capitulate to the demands of the multiculturalists, we might "create a self-ful‹lling prophecy" and produce a multicultural society, though none currently exists in the United States (Chavez 1994, 26) . And a well-known conservative describes the process through which a culture can erode over time. He argues that the essentially WASP American character, rooted in hard work, civic-mindedness, and individual consciences, has come under attack. "The danger is not that a new post-WASP personality will emerge. A nation's character is not so mutable; it takes major upheaval-revolution, conquest-to transform it. What is possible, however, is that the character America already possesses will slip into chronic malfunction. Most of us will keep behaving the way we always have, without knowing why, while the rest will act differently, simply for the sake of being different." (Brookhiser 1993b, 79) . We are not powerless to change the culture, another conservative suggests, as the example of smoking illustrates. In the not-very-distant past, "the culture and its sus- 
The Culture Warriors
Those who participate in the culture wars are, of course, intensely aware of the struggle for control. As each side attempts to de‹ne the culture while fearing its opponents' ability to do likewise, a kind of mirror imagery appears in descriptions of the struggle. The Left says that at issue is "a powerful movement to impose intellectual and cultural hegemony on the whole society. The New Right agenda not only includes compulsory prayer; it demands compulsory heterosexuality, compulsory sobriety, compulsory racism, sexism, and imperialism" (Editorial 1984, 308) . The Right, in turn, explains "the Left's cultural agenda" as consisting of "primitivism, feminism, racialism, multiculturalism, and sexual radicalism. The Left wishes to . . . destroy every traditional social habit and institution, including churches and ending with the family" (Lipman 1991b, 38) . If a critic on the left portrays the culture war as a contest between questioning authority
and Father Knows Best, between self-expression and deference to norms (Ehrenreich 1993b, 74) , an observer on the right suggests that what "drives the culture war" is "the power of rationalization" that convinces people that "heretofore forbidden desires are permissible," whether such desires are homosexuality or abortion (Reilly 1996, 60) .
The two sides fear each other's in›uences in very similar ways. A commentator on the left cries out, "How long are we going to let conservatives de‹ne the national agenda on social issues?" (Tax 1995, 378) . And from the right, the question is, "Why is culture formed so completely by the Left, rather than by the Right?" (Lipman 1991b, 38) . Those on the right argue that support for the traditional family goes against "the reigning orthodoxy" (Marshner 1988, 39) and subjects one to "the charge of being a bigot, a religious nut, or just hopelessly out of touch" (Tucker 1993, 28) .
On the left, the contention is that "it's even harder to get a serious public hearing for a radical critique of the family than for a radical critique of capitalism" (Willis 1996, 22) . The Right accuses American society of a form of religious intolerance, suggesting that "culture makers" bear a "disdain bordering on contempt . . . for the deeply religious" (Krauthammer 1998, 92) . The Left argues that it is not possible in American society to "mock religious belief as childish" or to "describe God as our creation" because such sentiments violate "the norms of civility and religious correctness" (Kaminer 1996, 24) .
Both sides fear that their opponents have gained the upper hand in 24 culture wars and enduring american dilemmas framing the debates, in constructing the cultural realities. On the right, there is concern that the gay movement has succeeded in de‹ning a reality that makes opposition to homosexuals appear to be bigotry (Editorial 1998c, 16) . On the left, there is fear that the Christian Right's de‹nition of acceptability has made all gays seek to demonstrate that they're just as worthy (Ireland 1999, 16) .
Each side sees inadequacies in its own efforts to shape the culture. Con- There is mirror imagery, too, in the motives that each side assigns to its opponents. The Left argues that the culture wars are a right-wing effort to distract attention from the increasing inequality of income and wealth.
"It's the culture, stupid" (di Leonardo 1996, 25) . The Right, in contrast, suggests that for the Left, "culture-or rather cultures-replaces economics as the engine of revolutionary social change"; "power to the cultures" replaces "power to the people" (Lipman 1991a, 40) .
Each side accuses the other of "politicizing" culture. If the Left has argued that "the personal is political" because issues of feminism, abortion, and gay rights cannot be handled on a purely individual or personal level, the Right sees this as "politicizing." The Left politicizes everything, conservatives have argued, by taking private behaviors-such as homosexual acts-and bringing them into the public sphere. "The idea that one must be either in the closet or out of it is an invention of those who would politicize sex and abolish privacy" (Short 1990, 44) . When conservatives see politicization within their own ranks, it is with dismay. Thus, "the politicizing of religion" is seen as disastrous for both public life and religion (Neuhaus 1988a, 46) . For the Left, however, the Right "politicizes" culture when it disputes revisions of university curricula or the funding choices of the National Endowment for the Arts. As seen by the Left, the campaign against funding the National Endowment for the Arts is part of "the populist right's broader agenda" (Editorial 1995a, 152) ; it is based on "an amal-gam of high culture reactionaries, antigovernment ideologues and faux populists" (Pollitt 1997, 10) .
The Left accuses the Right of denying its own-inevitably politicalstances. Thus, conservatives' "uneasiness and sometimes distaste for minority subcultures: blacks, women, gays" goes along with "a tendency to advance a supposedly depoliticized (which means strongly political) view of culture that sees it as a museum of ‹xed consensual values" (Howe 1984, 29) . The Right, in turn, accuses the Left of being "determined to politicize" culture to undermine and destroy traditional habits and institutions (Lipman 1991b, 38) .
The mirror images of the contending culture warriors-the idea that criticism of the family is not acceptable versus the idea that the traditional family is out of fashion; the idea that one cannot criticize religion versus the idea that serious religious conviction is out of bounds; the idea that culture wars are a cover for increasing economic inequality versus the idea that they compensate for the failure of egalitarian ideas-re›ect an underlying social reality in which both sides are true. Americans are highly indi-
vidualistic, yet they endorse the importance of the family far more than their European counterparts do (see van Elteren 1998, 70) . Americans are highly religious but uncomfortable with extremists of any stripe. Americans are egalitarian in ideology but uncomfortable talking about class; thus, cultural issues cover for economic ones. The values of both sides in the culture war appear to be strongly present in the American population.
Perhaps only in America does a conservative who sees the traditional family as in tune with "the facts of human nature" nevertheless feel it necessary to argue that teaching children about family values does not inhibit self-expression. We need to train children in these traditional family values to help them understand their own nature, she argues. Children so trained are nonetheless free to reject these values when they mature, which is "why, contrary to what the relativists insist, instilling them is not oppressive" (Marshner 1988, 40) .
American Culture
Can one subscribe to the newer view of culture and still speak of an entity 'community'" (1986, 276) .
If many contemporary scholars are willing to abandon the concept of values and to question the idea of well-de‹ned cultures, others continue to assert that "deep culture is more than the epiphenomenal product of political and economic arrangements" (Wuthnow 2006, 28) and that cultural assumptions often make change dif‹cult. Assumptions about "individualism and the American dream," for example, may "make it dif‹cult to confront inequality and discrimination" (Wuthnow 2005, 363 ). Yet as Bennett
Berger has observed, culture entails "a continuing historical process" in which "the meaning of none of the key terms is ‹xed over time" (1995, 39) .
Indeed, many aspects of the "American Creed" can be seen as persisting while being subjected to change, con›ict, and the evolution of new mean-28 culture wars and enduring american dilemmas ings. American culture is embodied in enduring dilemmas rather than enduring values.
To some extent, the very religiosity and morality that appear to inhere in the American Creed may help to generate con›icts. Many scholars have argued that Americans are among the most religious people in Christendom because voluntaristic sects rather than hierarchical churches have dominated American religious institutions. "The sectarian is expected to follow a moral code, as determined by his/her own sense of rectitude, re›ecting a personal relationship with God." The American sects have thus "produced a moralistic people" (Lipset 1996, 19-20) . Con›icts about public policy are "intense" and "morally based" as "people quarrel sharply about how to apply the basic principles of Americanism they purport to agree about" (26). If the contemporary culture wars differ from those of the past, it is only because we have become increasingly aware of such contention and increasingly conscious of the tenuousness with which all cultural ideas are held. One does not need to be a sociologist to recognize the speed with which ideas about sexual practices, for example, have changed. Premarital sex has become the norm. Homosexuality has lost its exoticism. Indeed, gay activists were well aware that the more their members came out of the closet, the less dif‹cult the struggle for acceptance would become. Self-con- The chapters that follow explore each of the American cultural dilemmas in which the culture wars are embedded through the lens of two decades' worth of political commentary. Where data are available concerning public sentiments on these issues, these data are incorporated into the narratives. Also addressed are historical and theoretical arguments concerning the larger issues-for example, questions about American religiosity and civil religion, the nature of American individualism and pluralism, and how multiculturalism is related to individualism. Although there is more agreement among the cultural antagonists than is usually imagined, there is also more internal disagreement within each camp than is usually acknowledged. These internal divisions are explored in the penultimate chapter, which assesses the current forms of polarization in American society, whether they result from an "American exceptionalism," and whether 
